Category: Compliance Programs

Fraud Detected More Often At Bankrupt Companies

Bankrupt companies are three times more likely to have been cited for fraud by U.S. regulators, according to a study released on Monday from Deloitte Financial Advisory Services LLP. The study also showed that fraud incidents were much more likely to land a company in bankruptcy court.

Sheila Smith, head of reorganization services at Deloitte said it was not clear whether employees at bankrupt companies are more likely to commit fraud or whether the microscope of bankruptcy makes it easier for regulators to detect it.

See also:

Leading Corporate Integrity: Defining the Role of the Chief Ethics and Compliance Officer

Fellows of the Ethics Resource Center, Business Roundtable Institute for Corporate Ethics, the Ethics and Compliance Officer Association, the Open Compliance and Ethics Group (OCEG), and the Society of Corporate Compliance & Ethics put together Leading Corporate Integrity: Defining the Role of the Chief Ethics and Compliance Officer (pdf).

Senior corporate executives are under great pressure to build and maintain strong  organizational ethics programs. The stakes are high for any organization that fails to make ethics a priority and then finds itself embroiled in scandal. Public perceptions—often driven by the media—spoil a company’s reputation and weaken its brand value. Lowered trust among investors can devastate a company’s ability to attract support for growth. Regulators and lawmakers may move swiftly to punish and/or further regulate those who step outside accepted ethical boundaries.

Today, many organizations are choosing to consolidate the critical responsibility for ethics and compliance programs under a chief ethics and compliance officer (CECO). But the specific roles and reporting lines for this relative newcomer among corporatemanagement positions are not always clearly defined;many CECOs report feeling set up for failure due to insufficient authority or inadequate resources.

This paper is intended to serve as the starting point for a dialogue within corporate management circles—particularly among CEOs, boards of directors and the CECOs themselves—about the proper placement, qualifications, and responsibilities for a leader of the corporate ethics and compliance function. This paper also provides resources and identifies additional steps for further examination of this critical management function.

Opening Securities and Futures Accounts from an OFAC Perspective

The Office of Foreign Assets Control published new guidance specific to the securities industry on 11/06/2008: Opening Securities and Futures Accounts from an OFAC Perspective.

A strong OFAC compliance program consists of procedures that are similar to those found in a brokerage firm’s Customer Identification Program (“CIP”). Firms should use risk-based measures for verifying the identity of each new customer who opens an account. In establishing procedures, firms should identify and consider their size (e.g., total assets under management), their location, their customer base, the types of accounts they maintain, the methods by which accounts can be opened (e.g., in person or non face-to-face), and the types of identifying information available for each customer. Firms should also assess risks posed by each customer and transaction, asking questions such as:

  • Is the customer regulated by a Federal functional regulator, widely known, or listed on an exchange?
  • Has the firm had any previous experience with the customer or does it have prior knowledge about the customer?
  • Is the firm facilitating a U.S. person’s investment in a foreign issuer or other company that conducts business in a sanctioned country?
  • Is the customer located in a high-risk foreign jurisdiction that is considered to be poorly regulated or in a known offshore banking or secrecy haven?
  • Is the customer located or does it maintain accounts in countries where local privacy laws, regulations, or provisions prevent or limit the collection of client identification or beneficial ownership information?

Prior to entering into a business relationship with a client, you should screen the new client’s identification information, as well as the customer’s proposed transaction(s), against OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons list (“SDN list”) [which is available at
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/SDN-List/Pages/default.aspx], and applicable OFAC sanctions programs.

The paper highlights a few key differences between OFAC compliance and CIP requirements. OFAC requires you to look deeper into the beneficial ownership of a client. CIP is limited to the “person that opens a new account.”

The other key difference is that OFAC does not permit you to reallocate your legal liability to a third party such as an introducing firm. OFAC takes the position that you can still be “held liable for any OFAC violations that occur due to the third parties’ negligence.”

Corporate Governance of Public Web Sites

Jane K. Storero and Yelena Barychev of The Legal Intelligencer and Law.com authored an article that the system of reviewing and monitoring information posted on a company Web site should be part of the disclosure controls included in the enterprise-wide risk management system established by the company: Corporate Governance of Public Web Sites.

This article describes methods of effectively complying with the SEC guidance related to company websites: Commission Guidance on the Use of Company Websites (Release 34-58288, August 7, 2008).

That release gave some guidance as to whether a company’s website is a means of public dissemination of information under Regulation FD.

It also addresses how the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws can be applied to a statements made on the internet.  One issue is whether historical information is considered “republished” each time the material is accessed on the company’s website. If they are considered republished, then the company would have a duty to update the materials.

As a general matter, we believe that the fact that investors can access previously posted materials or statements on a company’s web site does not in itself mean that such previously posted materials or statements have been reissued or republished for purposes of the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws, that the company has made a new statement, or that the company has created a duty to update the materials or statements.

The release also notes that hyperlinks to third party information could be implicated as part of the anti-fraud provisions. The key is the context of the hyperlink. If explicit approval or endorsement is plainly evident, then the hyperlink to a third party statement can be found to be a implicit approval of the statement in the hyperlinked web page.

The release also endorses the use of blogs:

We acknowledge the utility these interactive web site features afford companies and shareholders alike, and want to promote their growth as important means for companies to maintain a dialogue with their various constituencies. As we noted in the Shareholder Forum Release, companies may find these forums “of use in better gauging shareholder interest with respect to a variety of topics,” and the forums “could be used to provide a means for management to communicate with shareholders by posting press releases, notifying shareholders of record dates, and expressing the views of the company’s management and board of directors.”

Statements made on a blog or forum will not be treated any differently than any other statements made by the company for purposes of anti-fraud provisions.

The Implications of Stone v. Ritter

In 1996, Delaware’s Court of Chancery stated in the Caremark case that a director’s duty of good faith includes a duty to attempt to assure that a corporate information and reporting system exists, and that failure to do so may, under some circumstances, render a director liable for losses caused by the illegal conduct of employees. In 2006 the Delaware Supreme Court applied and clarified the Caremark language in the case of Stone v. Ritter.

Rebecca Walker of Walkercompliance.com wrote a summary of the Implications of Stone v. Ritter on Board Oversight of a Compliance Program.

The Stone decision formalizes the discussion that appeared in Caremark regarding potential liability of directors into a holding that directors may be liable for the damages resulting from legal violations committed by employees of a corporation, if directors fail to implement a reporting or information system or controls or fail to monitor such systems. The court places this duty of directors squarely within the duty of loyalty. The decision also provides a view of those factors that the court will use in deciding whether the board oversight of the company’s compliance program was adequate to prevent liability to the directors.

Sovereign Wealth Funds That Are Part of the IWG and Santiago Principles

The following sovereign wealth funds are part of the Internal Working Group of Soverign Wealth Funds and the Santiago Principles:

Australia
The Future Fund

Azerbaijan
State Oil Fund of the Republic of Azerbaijan

Botswana
Pula Fund

Canada
Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund

Chile
Economic and Social Stabilization Fund / Pension Reserve Fund

China
China Investment Corporation

Ireland
National Pensions Reserve Fund

Korea
Korea Investment Corporation

Kuwait
Kuwait Investment Authority

Libya
Libyan Investment Authority

New Zealand
New Zealand Superannuation Fund

Norway
Government Pension Fund-Global

Qatar
Qatar Investment Authority

Russia
Reserve Fund
National Wealth Fund

Singapore
Temasek Holdings Pte. Ltd.
Government of Singapore Investment Corporation Pte. Ltd.

Timor Leste
Petroleum Fund of Timor-Leste

Trinidad and Tobago
Heritage and Stabilization Fund

The United Arab Emirates
Abu Dhabi Investment Authority

The United States
Alaska Permanent Fund

[IWG Member Sites]

The Santiago Principles

The International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds created a set of 24 best practices called the Generally Accepted Principles and Practices (GAPP) or the Santiago Principles:

  • GAPP 1. Principle
    The legal framework for the SWF should be sound and support its effective operation and the achievement of its stated objective(s).

    • GAPP 1.1 Subprinciple The legal framework for the SWF should ensure the legal soundness of the SWF and its transactions.
    • GAPP 1.2 Subprinciple The key features of the SWF’s legal basis and structure, as well as the legal relationship between the SWF and the other state bodies, should be publicly disclosed.
  • GAPP 2. Principle
    The policy purpose of the SWF should be clearly defined and publicly disclosed.
  • GAPP 3. Principle
    Where the SWF’s activities have significant direct domestic macroeconomic implications, those activities should be closely coordinated with the domestic fiscal and monetary authorities, so as to ensure consistency with the overall macroeconomic policies.
  • GAPP 4. Principle There should be clear and publicly disclosed policies, rules, procedures, or arrangements in relation to the SWF’s general approach to funding, withdrawal, and spending operations.
    • GAPP 4.1 Subprinciple The source of SWF funding should be publicly disclosed.
    • GAPP 4.2 Subprinciple The general approach to withdrawals from the SWF and spending on behalf of the government should be publicly disclosed.
  • GAPP 5. Principle
    The relevant statistical data pertaining to the SWF should be reported on a timely basis to the owner, or as otherwise required, for inclusion where appropriate in macroeconomic data sets.
  • GAPP 6. Principle
    The governance framework for the SWF should be sound and establish a clear and effective division of roles and responsibilities in order to facilitate accountability and operational independence in the management of the SWF to pursue its objectives.
  • GAPP 7. Principle
    The owner should set the objectives of the SWF, appoint the members of its governing body(ies) in accordance with clearly defined procedures, and exercise oversight over the SWF’s operations.
  • GAPP 8. Principle
    The governing body(ies) should act in the best interests of the SWF, and have a clear mandate and adequate authority and competency to carry out its functions.
  • GAPP 9. Principle
    The operational management of the SWF should implement the SWF’s strategies in an independent manner and in accordance with clearly defined responsibilities.
  • GAPP 10. Principle
    The accountability framework for the SWF’s operations should be clearly defined in the relevant legislation, charter, other constitutive documents, or management agreement.
  • GAPP 11. Principle
    An annual report and accompanying financial statements on the SWF’s operations and performance should be prepared in a timely fashion and in accordance with recognized international or national accounting standards in a consistent manner.
  • GAPP 12. Principle
    The SWF’s operations and financial statements should be audited annually in accordance with recognized international or national auditing standards in a consistent manner.
  • GAPP 13. Principle
    Professional and ethical standards should be clearly defined and made known to the members of the SWF’s governing body(ies), management, and staff.
  • GAPP 14. Principle
    Dealing with third parties for the purpose of the SWF’s operational management should be based on economic and financial grounds, and follow clear rules and procedures.
  • GAPP 15. Principle
    SWF operations and activities in host countries should be conducted in compliance with all applicable regulatory and disclosure requirements of the countries in which they operate.
  • GAPP 16. Principle
    The governance framework and objectives, as well as the manner in which the SWF’s management is operationally independent from the owner, should be publicly disclosed.
  • GAPP 17. Principle
    Relevant financial information regarding the SWF should be publicly disclosed to demonstrate its economic and financial orientation, so as to contribute to stability in international financial markets and enhance trust in recipient countries.
  • GAPP 18. Principle
    The SWF’s investment policy should be clear and consistent with its defined objectives, risk tolerance, and investment strategy, as set by the owner or the governing body(ies), and be based on sound portfolio management principles.

    • GAPP 18.1 Subprinciple The investment policy should guide the SWF’s financial risk exposures and the possible use of leverage.
    • GAPP 18.2 Subprinciple The investment policy should address the extent to which internal and/or external investment managers are used, the range of their activities and authority, and the process by which they are selected and their performance monitored.
    • GAPP 18.3 Subprinciple A description of the investment policy of the SWF should be publicly disclosed.
  • GAPP 19. Principle
    The SWF’s investment decisions should aim to maximize risk-adjusted financial returns in a manner consistent with its investment policy, and based on economic and financial grounds.

    • GAPP 19.1 Subprinciple If investment decisions are subject to other than economic and financial considerations, these should be clearly set out in the investment policy and be publicly disclosed.
    • GAPP 19.2 Subprinciple The management of an SWF’s assets should be consistent with what is generally accepted as sound asset management principles.
  • GAPP 20. Principle
    The SWF should not seek or take advantage of privileged information or inappropriate influence by the broader government in competing with private entities.
  • GAPP 21. Principle
    SWFs view shareholder ownership rights as a fundamental element of their equity investments’ value. If an SWF chooses to exercise its ownership rights, it should do so in a manner that is consistent with its investment policy and protects the financial value of its investments. The SWF should publicly disclose its general approach to voting securities of listed entities, including the key factors guiding its exercise of ownership rights.
  • GAPP 22. Principle
    The SWF should have a framework that identifies, assesses, and manages the risks of its operations.

    • GAPP 22.1 Subprinciple The risk management framework should include reliable information and timely reporting systems, which should enable the adequate monitoring and management of relevant risks within acceptable parameters and levels, control and incentive mechanisms, codes of conduct, business continuity planning, and an independent audit function.
    • GAPP 22.2 Subprinciple The general approach to the SWF’s risk management framework should be publicly disclosed.
  • GAPP 23. Principle
    The assets and investment performance (absolute and relative to benchmarks, if any) of the SWF should be measured and reported to the owner according to clearly defined principles or standards.
  • GAPP 24. Principle
    A process of regular review of the implementation of the GAPP should be engaged in by or on behalf of the SWF.

There is also a Full Report on the Santiago Principles (.pdf).

Policy Lifecycles

Sumner Blount of CA puts together his thoughts on the lifecycles of policies:Policy Lifecycles: The Foundation for a Unified GRC Approach.

As you can easily see, it’s a constant feedback loop, where policies are devised, controls are created and tested, and risks adjusted based on the success of those controls.

Politically Exposed Person

Politically Exposed Person “PEP” is a person who may be or recently acted in the political arena of a country or has held a position in the recent past. These individuals must be tracked by financial institutions as they pose potential risk.

PEP-specific compliance legislation underlines the link between corrupt politicians, money laundering and the financing of terrorism. More than 100 countries have changed their laws related to financial services regulation, with the fight against political corruption playing a foundational role.

The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) definition of a Politically Exposed Person:

  • current or former senior official in the executive, legislative, administrative, military, or judicial branch of a foreign government (elected or not)
  • a senior official of a major foreign political party
  • a senior executive of a foreign government owned commercial enterprise, being a corporation, business or other entity formed by or for the benefit of any such individual
  • an immediate family member of such individual; meaning spouse, parents, siblings, children, and spouse’s parents or siblings
  • any individual publicly known (or actually known by the relevant financial institution) to be a close personal or professional associate.