It’s sad day in Boston. We’ve become accustomed to winning and the Super Bowl drought continues for at least another year. There were two compliance-related stories that came out of Super Bowl XLVI.

The first was singer M.I.A.’s obscene gesture and expletive during the halftime show. After Janet Jackson’s nipple-gate incident eight years ago, you would think the network would keep a finger close to the censor button during halftime. Perhaps they were too closely following Madonna and forgot about the other performers.

Madonna hasn’t been controversial for two decades. Others on the half-time show stage have been known to do and say things that would violate network standards.

The second compliance-related incident was the reluctant touchdown by Ahmad Bradshaw as time was winding down in the fourth quarter. Was his job to score touchdown? or to help his team win? usually, those goals are aligned.

By scoring that touchdown, he gave his team the lead, but also gave Tom Brady more time to mount a comeback. (A comeback that failed. ) If Bradshaw had managed to sit down on the 1 yard line, the Giants would be able to burn more time off the clock and just have to make a relatively easy field goal.

The Patriots had a similar problem. Rarely is a defense called up to let the opposing team score.

Even firms where conflicts of interest are well managed need to realize that sometimes the alignment of interests breaks down. Sometimes, doing the right thing for the organization is different from what you are used to doing.

Mitt Romney puts his business background at the front of his campaign message. As the current front-runner for the Republican nomination, his background is going under increased scrutiny. Since his business background is in private equity, the industry should stop and wonder whether all of this publicity will be good or bad for private equity.

Hopefully people will not be as confused by private equity as they are with whether “Mitt” is short for Mittens. In listening to hearings on private equity and venture capital, many congressmen seem to think that private equity is only about leveraging healthy companies with lots of debt, firing lots of the employees, then quickly ripping them apart, and selling the pieces. If successful. Otherwise, they fire most of the employees and merely plunge their portfolio companies them into bankruptcy.

There is the obvious problem in how you define success. The Wall Street Journal looked at the Bain portfolio and found that 22% of its portfolio companies either filed for bankruptcy or shut down. The story failed to add any context about whether that is better or worse than average. Lots of companies run into trouble. There were over 13,000 Chapter 11 bankruptcy filings in fiscal year 2010. Add in some percentage of the 1.5 million chapter 7 bankruptcies that were businesses, not individuals.

Certainly, Bain Capital made money for its investors. The Wall Street Journal found that Bain produced about $2.5 billion in gains for its investors who had put in $1.1 billion in capital.

Even in the Walk Street Journal story, there is a disagreement about the right measuring stick and which failures should be attributed to Bain. In some cases, the failure came after a partial Bain exit.

Of course, the statistics can’t cover what would have happened to the business if Bain failed to step in or private equity failed to take an interest. They may have failed anyway.

I suspect the answer to whether private equity is good or bad will be twisted around Mitt Romney. His supporters will laud his business success and his detractors will attack his job cuts and business failures. (I lived with Mitt Romney as governor and don’t have a position on candidacy. He was mostly limited by the state legislature in what he could do, a similar position that Congress limits Presidential action. )

In the end, private equity will likely come out of the election cycle bruised and battered.

Sources:

• The Mittster and the Job Figures Posted by John Cassidy in the New Yorker
• Romney at Bain: Big Gains, Some Busts by Mark Maremont in the Wall Street Journal
• What Makes Small Businesses Sink or Swim?
• What is Mitt Romney’s First Name from Vanity Fair
• Unites States Trustee Program Annual report Fiscal Year 2010 (.pdf)

If you are looking for a good guide to help your private equity compliance program, PEI Media’s US Private Equity Fund Compliance Guide is a good place to start. There have been a few changes since its publication in 2010. PEI Media has just published the US Private Equity Fund Compliance Companion to provide an update on the new and amended regulations, hoping to deliver some timely information before the March 30, 2012 registration deadline.

Charles Lerner of Fiduciary Compliance Associates was the lead editor and asked me to contribute a chapter. (That means I can offer you a discount of 20%. use the code: COMP_20)

Other contributors include:

• Daniel Bender
• Erik A. Bergman
• Timothy M. Clark
• Winston Chan
• Peter Cogan
• Doug Cornelius
• Karl Ehsam
• Kimberly Everitt
• Daniel Faigus
• Craig Friedman
• Thomas S. Harman
• David Harpest
• Ebonie D. Hazle
• Jeanette Lewis
• Matthew Maulbeck
• Leslie Meredith
• Edward D. Nelson
• John J. O’Brien
• James T. Parkinson
• Scott Pomfret
• Michael Quilatan
• Jay Regan
• John Schneider
• Justin J. Shigemi
• Kate Simpson
• Mark Trousdale
• Joel A. Wattenbarger

PEI’s description.

 Featuring expert advice from over 30 compliance and legal professionals, this guide for chief compliance officers (CCOs) provides practical guidance on the legal and operational issues that registered investment advisers are required to comply with, and what the CCO role entails with useful checklists and practical tips.

The companion also features an exclusive roundtable discussion among a chief compliance officer, a head of investor relations and three attorneys. In this candid and informative session, these compliance experts discuss reporting net as well as gross performance results, limitation on general or public solicitations of investors, fundraising in new markets, limited partner due diligence and social media policy – it’s a discussion that will reveal the realities of the brave new world for registered investment advisers.

You can see the table of contents and read two chapters in the US PE Compliance Companion. (.pdf)

Here are some recent compliance-related stories that caught my attention.

The Saga of MF Global – Don’t Shoot the Messenger, Fire the Chief Compliance Officer by Tom Fox

Both the DOJ minimum best practices and the amendment to the US Sentencing Guidelines, giving the CCO direct access to a company’s Board of Directors, would seem to provide the profile that would mandate that a Board wants to know the reason why a CCO (or Chief Risk Officer) would suddenly resign, particularly after he “repeated clashed” with a CEO over compliance issues. The universal corporate blanket “resigned to pursue other opportunities” is a white-wash that a Board should look beyond, if indeed that reason was given to the MF Board. The bottom line is that when a CCO leaves, particularly if it was due to a clash with the CEO, the Board had better take a close look into the reasons as it may be that the CEO wants to take risks which could put the company at grave risk.

The SEC Issues Disclosure Guidance on RELPs and REITs by Vanessa Schoenthaler in 100 F Street

The Securities and Exchange Commission’s Office of Investor Education and Advocacy published an Investor Bulletin on real estate investment trusts (REITs) and, at the same time, the Division of Corporation Finance issued informal disclosure guidance detailing the comments it most frequently raises when reviewing sales materials submitted by real estate limited partnerships (RELP) and REITs pursuant to Securities Act Industry Guide 5.

Legal bloggers are eligible for free passes to attend the LegalTech conference in New York, Jan. 30 to Feb. 1, 2012. This is a full-access pass, covering all programs and the exhibit hall. There is also a Blogger’s Breakfast on Tuesday, Jan. 31, at 9 a.m. in the Petit Triannon room at the New York Hilton. To reserve your free pass, send an email to Carl Seering at cseering@alm.com. Be sure to include your name, company or firm, address, email and phone number.

A group of organizations with Investment Adviser stakeholders engaged the Boston Consulting Group to conduct an economic analysis of IA oversight scenarios (.pdf) in the Securities and Exchange Commission’s study released in January 2011. The analysis came down solidly in favor of increased funding of the SEC as the solution for increased oversight of investment advisers.

BCG looked at the three options in the SEC’s 914 study: (1) enhancing the SEC’s ability to oversee advisers (2) allowing FINRA to oversee RIAs and (3) creating a new IA-only SRO. The first option was examined in two segments: (a) giving the SEC enough examiners to do the job and (b) full resources. The costs represented what it would take for each option to examine every registered investment adviser firm at least once every four years.

Estimates from BCG study of costs for 3 top choices for examining RIAs

The study provides some interesting insight as to staffing. The average examiner productivity is assumed to be 3.0 examinations per examiner per year, based on the five year SEC average of 3.0 IA examinations per examiner per year.31 In order to achieve an average examination frequency of once every four years, with examiner productivity of 3.0 examinations per examiner per year, 787 examiners are required.

The parties who requested the study are the Investment Adviser Association, Certified Financial Planner Board of Standards, the Financial Planning Association, the National Association of Personal Financial Advisors and TD Ameritrade Institutional in commissioning the study.Given that the vast majority of investment adviser firms do not want FINRA as their regulator/examiner it should come as no surprise as to the results of the study.

I expected to see the additional costs of SEC oversight of an SRO. It’s a bit unfair that the SEC costs are only for examination and not enforcement. The SRO figures include that additional cost.

It should also come as no surprise that FINRA disputed the findings. Rumor has it that they are pushing hard to become the SRO for investment advisers.

In any event, it will take legislation from Congress to implement any of these scenarios. The typical Congressman’s knee-jerk reaction to this seems to be “Madoff.” That does not bode well for increased resources for the SEC.

Sources:

• Investment Adviser Oversight: Economic Analysis of Options (.pdf) by the Boston Consulting Group
• Advisory firms would pay twice as much with Finra as regulator: Study by Mark Schoeff Jr.in Investment News
• RIAs would pay nearly double annually if FINRA were their SRO, study claims in IA Watch (subscription required)
• SEC Study on Enhancing Investment Adviser Examinations – prior post on Compliance Building

We reckoned now that we were at the Pole. Of course, every one of us knew that we were not standing on the absolute spot; it would be an impossibility with the time and the instruments at our disposal to ascertain that exact spot. But we were so near it that the few miles which possibly separated us from it could not be of the slightest importance. 

Roald Amundsen – December 14, 1911

The South Pole is a harsh and isolated environment. It’s bit more plush now that when man first stepped on the location 100 year ago. Amundsen slept in a small tent. Today visitors can take it a bit easier in the Amundsen-Scott South Pole Station. You can even see a picture of the day from the South Pole.

At least during the Antarctic summer when the average high is a balmy -15°F with near endless daytime. From mid-April to mid-August, the only natural light comes from the moon and the aurora australis. Those settled in for the Antarctic winter don’t see the sun for months and the average high drops to a bone-chiling -68°F

The current station is on jacks so it can battle the 8 inches of snow that accumulates each year by raising its elevation. Since it’s sitting on a moving glacier it moves about 10 meters each year. It’s in constant movement, battling the forces of nature that kept in uninhabited until modern technology was able to fight back against the elements.

There are many comparisons you can draw between the South Pole and a compliance program.  I’ll let you draw your own.

Last week, the SEC announced THREE actions against investment advisers for compliance failures. The Securities and Exchange Commission has turned the dial a little higher and announced FOUR enforcement actions against multiple hedge funds by identifying abnormal investment performance. (Does their dial turn all the way up to 11?)

The SEC launched an initiative to combat hedge fund fraud by identifying abnormal investment performance — the Aberrational Performance Inquiry. Back in March, SEC Enforcement Director Robert Khuzami revealed during congressional testimony that the SEC had launched an initiative that would focus on funds that consistently outperform the market.  Enforcement is now focusing on hedge funds that outperform “market indexes by 3% and [are] doing it on a steady basis.” Khuzami referred to such performance as “aberrational,” and stated that Enforcement is “canvassing all hedge funds” for such “aberrational performance.” The SEC Enforcement Division’s Asset Management Unit uses proprietary risk analytics to evaluate hedge fund returns. Performance that appears inconsistent with a fund’s investment strategy or other benchmarks can form a basis for further scrutiny. This initiative came directly from from the Madoff scandal. If they had focused on Madoff’s consistent and aberrational returns, the SEC may have caught him sooner.

Half a year later, Khuzami is crediting Aberrational Performance Inquiry initiative with these four enforcement actions.

Michael Balboa and Gilles De Charsonville

These two were nabbed for overvaluing the reported returns and net asset value of the Millennium Global Emerging Credit Fund, organized to invest in sovereign and corporate debt instruments from emerging markets. Among the fund assets were Nigerian payment adjusted warrants and Uruguayan value recovery rights.

In October 2008, the hedge fund’s reported assets were $844 million. The SEC’s complaint alleges that Balboa, the fund’s former portfolio manager, schemed with two European-based brokers including Gilles De Charsonville to inflate the fund’s reported monthly returns and net asset value by manipulating its supposedly independent valuation process.

Apparently the SEC found Balboa’s action particularly egregious because the the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York announced the arrest of Balboa and filing of a criminal action against him.

According to the SEC complaint, from at least January to October 2008, Balboa provided De Charsonville and another broker with fictional prices for two of the fund’s illiquid securities holdings for them to pass on to the fund’s outside valuation agent and its auditor. The scheme caused the fund to  overvalue these holdings by as much as $163 million in August 2008.  That meant falsely-positive monthly returns, millions of dollars more in management fees, another $410 million in new investments, and the avoidance of  about $230 million in redemptions.

The SEC is crediting their new initiative with this enforcement action, but the fund has been in liquidation since October of 2008.

ThinkStrategy Capital Management and Chetan Kapur

The SEC charged ThinkStrategy Capital Management LLC and its sole managing director Chetan Kapur with fraud in connection with two funds. ThinkStrategy Capital Fund was an equities-trading fund that ceased operations in 2007.  TS Multi-Strategy Fund was a fund of hedge funds. At its peak in 2008, ThinkStrategy managed approximately $520 million in assets.

The SEC’s complaint alleges that ThinkStrategy and Kapur engaged in a pattern of deceptive conduct designed to bolster their track record, size, and credentials. They materially overstated the performance of the Capital Fund and gave investors the false impression that the fund’s returns were consistently positive and minimally volatile. ThinkStrategy and Kapur also repeatedly inflated the firm’s assets, exaggerated the firm’s longevity and performance history. In 2008 they reported a 4.6% return when they actually had a -89.9% return. It looks like the trouble started in June of 2006.

They also made claims about the quality of their due diligence checks. Unfortunately, they ended up invested in the Bayou Superfund, Valhalla/Victory Funds and Finvest Primer Fund, each of which was revealed to be engaged in serious fraud.

ThinkStrategy also faked a management team, listing several individuals as principals or directors who had no affiliation with the firm. A few were Kapur’s classmates at Wharton. Kapur himself claimed to have an MBA from Wharton, even though he only had an undergraduate degree. Kapur claimed to have over 15 years of experience as an “investor, money manager, researcher, and system designer”. That means he would have started his career in 1988 at the age of 14.

As with most SEC settlements, these are merely allegations against Kapur and ThinkStrategy which they neither admit or deny.  The funds wound down over a year ago and other investors brought suit. In this case, I’m not sure you can credit the SEC with shutting down a bad fund using this Aberrational Performance Inquiry initiative.

Patrick Rooney and Solaris Management

According to the SEC’s complaint, Rooney and Solaris made a radical change in the fund’s investment strategy, contrary to the fund’s offering documents and marketing materials, by going all in for Positron Corp. In late 2008, Solaris held over 1.1 billion shares of Positron stock and had liquidated all of its non-Positron investments.

That’s certainly a risky binary bet on one company. You don’t usually see concentrated, undiversified, and illiquid position in a cash-poor company with a lengthy track record of losses.

The big problem was that Rooney was also the Chairman of Positron  and received salary and stock options from Positron.  Rooney and Solaris hid the Positron investments and Rooney’s relationship with the company from the fund’s investors for over four years. Although Rooney finally told investors about the Positron investments in a March 2009 newsletter, he allegedly lied by telling them he became Chairman to safeguard the fund’s investments.

It’s hard to see how Solaris would have been outperforming the market by more than 3% and fallen under the watchful eye of the new initiative.

LeadDog Capital Markets, Chris Messalas and Joseph LaRocco

The SEC instituted administrative proceedings against LeadDog Capital Markets LLC and its general partners and owners Chris Messalas and Joseph LaRocco. The charges were for misrepresenting or failing to disclose material information to investors in the LeadDog Capital LP fund.

The Fund was almost entirely invested in illiquid penny-stocks or other micro-cap private companies, each of which had received “going concern” opinions from their auditors, all but one of which had a consistent history of net losses, and most of which they or their affiliates owned or controlled

In addition, LeadDog, Messalas, and LaRocco allegedly misrepresented to, and concealed from, existing and prospective investors the substantial conflicts of interests and related party transactions that characterized the fund’s illiquid investments. For example, to induce one elderly investor to invest $500,000 in the fund, LeadDog, Messalas, and LaRocco represented falsely that at least half of the fund’s assets were liquid and could be marked to market each day, and that the investor could exit the fund at any time. In February 2009, the SEC alleges that 92% of the fund’s non-cash assets were illiquid and could not be marked-to-market on a daily basis.

In October 0f 2009, the fund’s auditors learned about some of the problems, resigned, and issued a retraction letter. Let’s assume that the date the problems were discovered. We could credit the initiative with taking action in this case. It would just be two years before charges were filed.

Assuming the allegations are true, these four cases are good cases for SEC enforcement. The consistent out performance initiative is a good one. However, these four just don’t seem to fit in the right time frame for the new enforcement initiative. Since these fund managers were not registered with the SEC, there is no good database for the SEC to check returns and easily find the outliers. Perhaps once Form PF reports start flowing, the SEC will have a better database to go looking for problems.

Sources:

• SEC Charges Multiple Hedge Fund Managers with Fraud in Inquiry Targeting Suspicious Investment Returns – SEC Press Release
• SEC Complaint against Michael Balboa and Gilles T. De Charsonville
• SEC’s complaint against ThinkStrategy Capital Management and Chetan Kapur
• SEC’s complaint against Patrick Rooney and Solaris Management
• Administrative Order Against Leaddog Capital Markets, Chris Messalas and Joseph LaRocco
• Outliers Identified in SEC’s ‘Aberrational Performance Inquiry’ Initiative Sued for Fraud by Bruce Carton in Compliance Week’s Enforcement Action
• SEC Enforcement Division To Focus On Hedge Funds That Outperform The Market by McDermott Will & Emery
• Spinal Tap – 11

As a compliance officer, I often find that many lessons come from enforcement actions. Those actions imposed on compliance officers are especially instructive. The latest to catch my attention comes from the United Kingdom.

The Financial Services Authority levied a £14,000 fine and banned a compliance officer from performing any significant influence function in regulated financial services. The circumstances arose from an employee’s attempt to conceal losses after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008.

Dr Sandradee Joseph was Compliance Officer at Dynamic Decisions Capital Management (DDCM), a hedge fund management company based in London. One of DDCM’s funds suffered catastrophic losses during the fall of 2008, losing 85% of its assets under management. A fund employee, rather than report the losses, decided to enter into a complicated bond transaction to create false profits. Essentially, the employee was buying bond units at a steep discount, but reporting a much greater value when calculating the fund’s NAV. The fund had lost $255 million, but the employee booked a $268 million gain on the bond transaction. A bond that the fund had only paid $5 million.

Three problems arose that the FSA thinks were instances of the compliance officer not doing her job.

The first was that the fund’s prime broker terminated its agreement with the fund because of the bond transaction. Any trade that causes the prime broker to leave should be a big red flag.

The second was an unhappy investor. The investor had put $48 million into the fund. The bond happened to violate some of its investment restrictions: maturity greater than 12 months, issued by an unlisted entity, no option to convert equity, and greater than 3% of the fund’s NAV. Violations of an investor’s investment guidelines should be a big red flag for a compliance officer.

The third problem was another unhappy investor. The bond transaction also violated this investor’s permitted investments limitation. A second big red flag that the compliance officer failed to remedy. This investor dug a bit deeper and felt that the bond may have been fraudulent.

The compliance officer tried a few defenses that sound weak to me. They sounded weak to the FSA as well.

• The compliance officer’s role was a reporting function and it was up to individual employee to ensure compliance.
• The compliance officer was not the fund’s lawyer and she could take a back seat on legal matters.
• The compliance officer felt enough advisers were looking at the issue.
• The compliance officer did not understand the bond and was relying on external lawyers to review it. (However, she never instructed a  law firm to to carry out due diligence on the bond.)
• The compliance officer believed the bond was legitimate. (Even though she disclosed that she didn’t understand it.)

The FSA lays out the lesson learned: “In her role, if [the compliance officer] became aware of concerns that the firm was not complying with its regulatory obligations, she should have taken steps to ensure that these concerns were investigated, to verify if the concerns appeared to be legitimate, and if so to take appropriate action.”

As a compliance officer, I initially found the punishment to be on the harsh side especially since it seems to single out the compliance officer. Then I dug a little deeper and saw that criminal investigations were started by the SFO and the investors filed suit against DDCM.

Sources:

• Final Notice for Dr Sandradee Joseph (.pdf)
• FSA fines and bans hedge fund Compliance officer £14,000 for failing to act with due skill, care and diligence FSA Press release
• FSA fines and bans Hedge Fund compliance officer by Maria Wall in Reed Smith’s Private Funds Law Update
• British Regulators Bar Hedge Fund Executive From Industry by Mark Scott in Dealbook

One of the requirements of registration as a registered investment adviser is the appointment of a Chief Compliance Officer and the establishment of a formal compliance program. The SEC stated that a firm need not hire a new person to be the CCO. However, there will be a substantial time commitment.

You can spread some of the compliance work to multiple people in the firm, though the CCO will ultimately be responsible for oversight. Another option is to send some of the work outside the firm that would outsource some or most of the compliance functions.

Insider trading monitoring is one of the candidates for outsourcing. There is a lot of data and a lot of paperwork to track. Even for a private equity firm that does not regularly trade in public securities, there is plenty to keep a person occupied during the week. For a private equity firm, some trade tracking software will go a long way to help the CCO (and the employees) deal with the invasive and tedious requirement to track employee trading.

The SEC rules also require an annual review and update of the compliance policies and procedures. This too is a likely area for outsourcing. A third party can provide additional insight to the firm as to what your peer firms are doing and what issues the regulators are focusing on.

Four bills made their way through the Capital Markets and Government Sponsored Enterprises Subcommittee of the House Financial Services Committee.

• Private Company Flexibility and Growth Act (H.R. 2167)
• Access to Capital for Job Creators Act (H.R. 2940)
• Entrepreneur Access to Capital Act (H.R. 2930)
• The Small Company Job Growth and Regulatory Relief Act (H.R. ____)

The Private Company Flexibility and Growth Act, introduced by Rep. David Schweikert, raises the shareholder threshold for mandatory registration with the SEC from 500 to 1,000 shareholders. I’m surprised it’s not called the Google/Facebook Act. The 500 shareholder limit is most famous for forcing Google to go public and is close to forcing Facebook to do the same.

The Access to Capital for Job Creators Act removes the regulatory ban that prohibit general solicitation and advertising in private placements. There were two amendments to the bill during the mark-up session. Maxine Waters (D-CA) included and amendment that the revised SEC rules allowing a general solicitation under Regulation D must require the issuer to take reasonable steps to verify that purchasers of the securities are accredited investors using methods determined by the SEC. Scott Garrett (R-NJ) included an amendment that Section 4(2) of the Securities Act be revised to add the language: “whether or not such transactions involve general solicitation or general advertising.”

The Entrepreneur Access to Capital Act permits “crowdfunding” to finance new businesses by allowing companies to accept and pool donations up to $5 million without registering with the SEC. It would limit individual investments to the lesser of $10,000 or 10% of an investor’s annual income. An amendment requiring a notice filing with the SEC was rejected as was an amendment that would have barred felons from being involved.

The Small Company Job Growth and Regulatory Relief Act would expand the exemptions available to small companies from the Section 404(b) auditor attestation reporting requirements to small and mid-size companies with a market capitalization of less than $500 million. The exemption is currently at the $75 million cap set by the Dodd-Frank Act. During the mark-up, the House panel amended the bill to lower the market float from $500 million to $350 million.

Will these go anywhere? The votes seemed to very partisan with Republicans voting yes and Democrats voting no. That does not bode well for moving up the chain through the house, through the Senate and on to the President’s desk.  However, President Obama has already indicated an interest in the crowdfunding idea.

These are not the grand, sweeping changes of Dodd-Frank. These are small tweaks to the regulations on the capital markets.

Sources:

• Markup of H.R. 1965, To amend the securities laws to establish certain thresholds for shareholder registration, and for other purposes (Rep. Himes); H.R. 2167, Private Company Flexibility and Growth Act (Rep. Schweikert); H.R. 2930, Entrepreneur Access to Capital Act (Rep. McHenry); H.R. 2940, Access to Capital for Job Creators Act (Rep. McCarthy); H.R. ____, Small Company Job Growth and Regulatory Relief Act of 2011 (Rep. Fincher)
• Legislation Allowing General Solicitation under SEC Rule 506 of Regulation D Approved by Capital Markets Subcommittee 
• House Panel Approves Legislation Expanding Section 404(b) Exemption from Companies with $75 Million to $350 Million Market Float
• House Panel Approves Crowdfunding Legislation to Help Create Jobs
• House Panel Advances Bills Raising 500-Shareholder Threshold for Public Companies and Community Banks
• House Panel Approves Legislation Expanding Section 404(b) Exemption from Companies with $75 Million to $350 Million Market Float